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Abstract 
 In this study, the ownership structure is classiﬁed into four classes: the institutional 
ownership, the corporate ownership, the management ownership and the foreign ownership, and 
diﬀerent attitudes regarding the above ownership have also been tested, that is, active monitoring 
hypothesis and interest convergence hypothesis. Since, in the sample research no information was 
found about foreign ownership, this type of ownership was not examined. But, in the case of other 
ownership, a separated hypothesis was developed based on diﬀerent approaches and their inﬂuence 
on the corporate value was examined. For each hypothesis, a multiple linear regression model was 
deﬁned based on the dependent variables. Companies listed in securities exchange commission of 
Iran makes up the statistical community of present study and the sample included 120 companies 
during 2008-2013. Correlation test and cross multiple regression test were used to examine the 
hypothesis. The results indicated no signiﬁcant relationship between the concentration of ownership 
and the corporate value. Also, there is no relationship between the institutional ownership and 
management ownership and the corporate value. However, there is a signiﬁcant relationship 
between the corporate ownership and the corporate value.  
Keywords: Ownership Structure, Ownership concentration, Institutional Ownership, 
Corporate value 
Introduction 
The basis of the studies of the corporate governance is the agency theory, many cases of 
conﬂict of the interests between groups and how the companies deal with such conﬂicts was 
suggested by the economists. Generally, these cases are expressed as agency theory. According to 
Jensen and Mecking (1976), the agency relationship is a relationship between one or more 
shareholder and owner and one or more agents. So as the agent is responsible for some services 
(Jensen and Meckling, 1976). In the agency theory, the owner’s goal is wealth maximization and to 
achieve this objective, they monitor the agents work and evaluated his/her performance. 
Determining the type of the ownership structure is a control tool in corporate. Determining factors 
of the type of the corporate ownership such as the ownership distribution, the concentration of 
ownership, the minority and majority shareholders in the texture of the corporate ownership are 
analyzable. So, generally, it is thought that the ownership structure may lead to changes in the 
corporates behavior. This is due to the monitoring activities that the various investors are doing in 
this structure (Velury and Jenkins, 2006). In this case, the question is whether the corporate value 
and their return are inﬂuenced by the diﬀerent structure of the corporate ownership. In surveys 
conducted on the surrounding ownership type, the role of diﬀerent types of ownership including 
state ownership, institutional ownership, corporate ownership, individual and family ownership, 
foreign ownership, management ownership and other types of ownership on the value of corporate 
and their returns was discussed.  
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The main goal of this study is to evaluate the impact of ownership structure on corporate 
value in the Tehran Stock Exchange (TSE). Importance of this research is that it shows 
experimentally managers, investors and other decision makers that being diﬀerent corporate 
ownership structure inﬂuences on corporate value. Namely, value of corporates will be diﬀerent 
when the company’s owners are among various groups like government, ﬁnancial institutions, 
banks, private companies and other ownership. 
In addition, which one of these ownerships has the most eﬀective in order for promoting 
corporate value? By the way, according to constitutional article 44 in Iran, the state tries to privatize 
governmental companies. On the other hand, private ownership includes corporate ownership, 
management ownership and foreign ownership and among them, two sets were evaluated and also 
their eﬀects on the company value in the present paper in order to expose beneﬁts of privatization 
namely: corporate ownership and management ownership. 
Literature review of previous studies 
In most studies on corporate values, the role of ownership structure was poorly exposed and 
various aspects of the property have not been considered. Four types of ownerships including the 
Institutional ownership, corporate ownership, managerial ownership and foreign ownership have 
been evaluated in the present study. According to Bushee (1998), institutional investors are big 
investors such as banks, insurance companies, investment companies and..., that their presence in 
companies led to changes in corporate behavior. Also, corporate investors include non-governmental 
entities and management investors are family companies being major ownership of companies in 
this study. But foreign ownership has not been found due to lack of foreign companies. In this study, 
we have studied diﬀerent perspectives on these structures. One of these hypotheses is the active 
monitoring hypothesis. When the manager is taking control most parts of the company’s shares, he 
may expose behavior in contrast with to the goal of maximizing corporate value. Another hypothesis 
is the convergence of interests, when the manager, is owner of low percentage of the company’s 
shares usually precede under the inﬂuence of market forces and eﬀective supervision in order to 
maximize the value of the Institute. Combining these two hypothesis leads to a non-linear 
relationship between ownership and corporate value ratio shown in Appendix-II chart. Jensen and 
Mecking (1976) have conducted much research on distribution of ownership and its impact on 
corporate value; they predicted that the corporate value is function of how the company allocates 
shares between internal and external individuals of company. Also, they stated in other study that 
more stock ownership by the board is improved corporate value. Shahira (2003) shows in his study 
in Egypt that there is no meaningful relationship between ownership type and P / BV and P / E 
indicators while there is a meaningful one between the type of ownership and ROA and ROE 
indicators. Jayesh Kumar (2004) considered the eﬀect of type of ownership structure on corporate 
value and through studying in India and concluded that managers had the greatest impact on 
corporate performance whereas foreign shareholders were not eﬃcient in corporate performance. 
Ariane Chapelle (2004) showed that approximately active companies in Belgium had 
concentrated ownership structure in Belgium stock market, because the concentration of ownership 
is one of the ways of controlling on corporations. Bernard Black (2002) has decided that companies 
having eﬃcient governing system had better performance in his survey under title of ”Does 
Corporate Governance predict Firms Market Value: Evidence from Korea” (Bernard, Black, Jang 
and Woochan, 2002). Shleifer and Vishy (1986) determined that the present institutional investors 
had the positive impact on company value because of increasing eﬃcient supervision. Also Morck, 
Shleifer and Vishny (1998) decided that there would not be no relationship between management 
ownership and institution’s market value of assets in other survey titled ”Management Ownership 
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and Market valuation”, whereas this relationship existed according to hypothesis of interest 
convergence. Barberies, Shleifer and Tsukanova (1996) concluded that any changes in ownership 
structure led to maximizing company values. This has been founded in other their study considering 
performance changes in 452 Russian companies. Earle (1998) and Kocenda and Svejnar (2002) 
came to achieve common goals based on positive impact on private ownership rather than state one 
in separate studies respectively in countries Russia and Czech Republic conducting on eﬀect of 
ownership framework on companies performance. Bushee (1998) having studied much on this ﬁeld 
stated that institutional investors as a type of corporate ownership structure led to changing 
companies behavior and he also added that the institutional investors controlled enterprises 
explicitly through collecting information and through managing corporation performance. In a 
research that Saikat Sovan Deb (2003) and colleagues conducted in India, they investigated the 
relationship between ownership structure and value in Indian ﬁrms by testing for “Monitoring and 
Expropriation” hypothesis as well as “Convergence of Interest” and “Entrenchment hypothesis”. 
They provided evidences in support of monitoring hypothesis but they could not ﬁnd any evidence 
in support of expropriation hypothesis. They report evidence in support of both “convergence of 
interest” and ”entrenchment hypothesis”. Alberto de Miguel (2003) in their study entitled “How 
does ownership structure Aﬀect ﬁrm value” it achieves the results as following: First, ownership 
concentration and insider ownership levels are determined by several institutional features such as 
investor protection, development of capital Markets, activity of the market for corporate control, and 
eﬀectiveness of boards. Second, the relationship between ownership concentration and ﬁrm value is 
not directly aﬀected by these institutional factors. Third, There is, however, a direct inﬂuence of 
corporate governance characteristics on the relationship between insider ownership and ﬁrm value. 
Alberto, Julio and Chabela & Michael Lemmon, Karl Lins (1997) studied eﬀect of ownership 
structure on corporate value during the East Asian ﬁnancial crisis in July 1997 . The evidence 
indicates that corporate ownership structure plays an important role in determining the incentives of 
insiders to expropriate minority shareholders during times of declining investment opportunities. 
Their results add to the literature that examines the link between ownership structure and ﬁrm 
performance and provide additional guidance to policy makers engaged in the ongoing debate about 
the proper role and design of corporate governance features and legal institutions in developing 
economies. 
Objectives of the study and research hypotheses  
The current paper is to examine the eﬀect of ownership framework on enterprise value, its 
ratio and number of present owners on structure of company’s capital. Ownership structure is 
divided into institutional ownership, corporate ownership management ownership, and foreign 
ownership. 
However, since related information was not found in the mentioned sample study, no 
hypothesis has been developed for this kind of ownership. So, the hypotheses of the research 
included the followings: 
Hypothesis 1. There is a meaningful relationship between the level of institutional owners 
and corporate value. 
Hypothesis 2. There is a meaningful relationship between the degree of concentration of 
institutional owners and corporate value. 
Hypothesis 3. There is a meaningful relationship between the level of corporate owners and 
corporate value. 
Hypothesis 4. There is a meaningful relationship degree of concentration of corporate owners 
and corporate value. 
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Hypothesis 5.There is a meaningful relationship between the level of management owners 
and corporate. 
Hypothesis 6. There is a meaningful relationship degree of concentration of management 
owners and corporate value. 
Methodology 
Statistical population of the current paper included companies listed in security exchange 
commission in Iran with the following needed qualiﬁcations:  
1. Their ﬁnancial year-end should be on March 29 and they should be active in exchange 
from 2008 until 2013. 
2. Financial information required, especially notes attached to ﬁnancial statement. 
3. Fiscal years of companies should not any changed during the period of study. 
According to the above mentioned conditions, 120 companies in the period 2008 to 2013 
were selected as samples. In this study data related to 120 samples was extracted from sources 
including RAHAVARIN, stock sites, TADBIRPARDAZ software and etc. Then, statistical tests 
were conducted using Excel and SPSS software. This research has applied methods of consolidated 
data in order to study the eﬀect of ownership concentration and type on value of corporate. The 
Present study is a descriptive one which is applied in lights of target and goals. There has been 
introduced a relationship between variables and also a meaningful relationship for variables 
depended on analyzing regression. For this reason, some models were introduced for each of the 
hypothesis of the study as follows: 
Model 1. This model was designed for hypotheses 1 and 2 (institutional owners). 
Val = α+β1INOWN+β2INCONC+β3PB+β4SIZE+β5DEBT+β6LOSS+β7CROWTH+εit. 
Model 2. This model was designed for hypotheses 3 and 4 (corporate owners). 
Val=α+β1COROWN+β2ICORCONC+β3PB+β4SIZE+β5DEBT+β6LOSS+β7CROWTH+εit 
Model 3. This model was designed for hypotheses 5 and 6 (management owners). 
          Val=α+β1MGROWN+β2MGRCONC+β3PB+β4SIZE+β5DEBT+β6LOSS+β7CROWTH+εit. 
Where 
Val = Value of Company 
INOWN = ratio of institutional ownership 
INCONC = degree of institutional ownership concentration 
COROWN = ratio of corporate ownership 
CORCONC = degree of corporate ownership concentration 
MGROWN = ratio of management ownership 
MGRCONC = degree of management ownership concentration 
PB = growth index (computed by the ratio of market value of equity to its book value) 
SIZE = size of ﬁrm (normal logarithm of total assets of the company i during the sample 
period) 
DEBT = leverage (calculated via the ratio of long-term debt to total assets.) 
Loss = artificial variables (if the company has losses, 1 otherwise 0) 
CROWTH = percentage change in total assets of the company i at the end year t to year t-1 
εit = unknown component  
CONC = concentration of ownership that is changing is simply how to distribute the shares 
among shareholders is greater than the number of shareholders will be focused acquisitions. 
In the present study, to calculate the concentration ratio of ownership of the Herfindahl-
Hirschman index is used. This index is an economic indicator and is obtained through the 
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percentage squared total of shares owned by corporate shareholders and for each type of ownership 
is calculated as follows: 
Degree of institutional ownership concentration  = ∑ 𝐼𝑁𝑂𝑊𝑁2𝑅𝑖−1  
Degree of corporate ownership concentration = ∑ 𝐶𝑂𝑅𝑂𝑊𝑁2𝑛𝑖−1  
Degree of management ownership concentration = ∑ 𝑀𝐺𝑅𝑂𝑊𝑁2𝑛𝑖−1  
The resulting index is between 0 and 1, if the result is a near to 1, represents concentration 
and the other hand, if is close to zero, would indicate lack of concentration. 
Results  
In Table 1, descriptive statistics about the test variables is given. Statistical indicators in this 
table, the number of observations, mean and standard deviation are shown. In Table 2, the results of 
hypotheses testing 1 and 2, is given in the form of model 1 designed. According to Table 2, among 
the control variables, variables PB, SIZE, DEBT, and CROWTH in 95% significance level are 
significant. On the other hand, F statistics indicated significant overall regression model was fitted 
to the confidence level is 95%. According to the results of the variable coefficient INOWN 
(institutional ownership ratio) is obtained negative indicating a negative correlation between the 
ratio of institutional ownership and corporate value, but because the 95% level of significance is 
indicated first hypothesis is confirmed. Also according to the results of Table 2 Variable Coefficient 
INCONC (degree of institutional ownership concentration) obtained a negative, but because the 
level of 95% is not significant, indicating the second hypothesis is rejected, i.e. between institutional 
ownership concentration and corporate value significant relationship does not exist. 
Table 1. A Summary of Statistics of all the variables 
SD Mean Number of Observation Statistical proxy 
0.29 0.30 810 PB 
1.6 27.41 810 SIZE 
0.16 0.75 810 DEBT 
0.30 0.25 810 CROWTH 
0.31 0.68 810 INOWN 
0.20 0.13 810 COROWN 
0.29 0.35 810 MGROWN 
0.23 0.23 810 CONC 
Table 2. Estimated parameters Hypothesis 1, 2 (Model 1) 
Adj. F P-value Coefficients  
12.40 0.018 2.35 PB 
 0.047 0.26 SIZE 
 0.03 3.33-  DEBT 
 0.12 0.11 LOSS 
 0.016 4.35 CROWTH 
 0.023 4.30-  INOWN 
 0.971 0.49-  INCONC 
In Table 3, the results of hypotheses testing 3 and 4, is given in the form of 2 models 
designed. According to Table 2, among the control variables, variables PB, SIZE, DEBT, and 
CROWTH in 95% significance level are significant. On the other hand, F statistics indicated 
significant overall regression model was fitted to the confidence level is 95%. According to the 
results of Table 3 the variable coefficient of corporate ownership (COROWN) obtained positive that 
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show a direct correlation between corporate ownership ratio and corporate value and also because 
the level of significance is 95% represents the third hypothesis is confirmed. According to Table 3 
and the coefficient of variable degree of corporate ownership concentration (CORCONC), because 
in the level of 95% is not significant, so the fourth hypothesis is rejected that reflect, there is no 
significant relationship between degree of corporate ownership concentration and corporate value. 
Table 3. Estimated parameters Hypothesis 3, 4 (Model 2) 
Adj F P-value Coefficients  
7.46 0.01 1.51 PB 
 0.035 0.18 SIZE 
 0.03 2.70-  DEBT 
 0.062 0.13 LOSS 
 0.035 4.45 CROWTH 
 0.02 5.97 COROWN 
 0.77 0.35 CORCONC 
In Table 4, the results of hypotheses testing 5 and 6, is given in the form of 3 models 
designed. According to Table 4 of the control variables, variables PB, SIZE, DEBT, CROWTH 95% 
significance level are significant. On the other hand F statistics indicated significant overall 
regression model was fitted to the confidence level is 95%. According to the results of the variable 
coefficient MGROWN (management ownership ratio) is obtained negative reflecting the inverse 
relationship between management ownership ratio and corporate value, but because the 95% level is 
significant indicating the fifth hypothesis is confirmed. Also according to the results of the variable 
coefficient MGRCONC (Degree of management ownership concentration) because the 95% level of 
significance has been the sixth hypothesis is rejected represent so there is no significant relationship 
between management ownership concentration and corporate value. 
Table 4. Estimated parameters Hypothesis 5, 6 (Model 3) 
Adj F P-value Coefficients  
5.97 0.02 3.35 PB 
 0.03 0.21 SIZE 
 0.03 3.75-  DEBT 
 0.02 0.3 LOSS 
 0.013 3.88 CROWTH 
 0.04 4.9-  MGROWN 
 0.97 0.17-  MGRCONC 
Conclusion 
Based on the findings, we can conclude that any change in the type of ownership structure 
leads to changes in behavior of the companies. This result can confirm the result of the survey 
named Velury and Jenkins having conducted in 2006). But, this type of behavior change is eﬀective 
on the company value regarding ownership type. The resent paper introduces corporate ownership 
the best one as a type of this framework. In other words, dominating this ownership on the company 
causes improving the status of enterprise and finally its value because this type of ownership seeks 
to follow better performance and increase profits for the companies. But, the other types of 
ownership, namely institutional ownership and management ownership are inversely correlation to 
corporate value. In other words, the purpose of this type of ownership is getting less gain and profit, 
so their presence in the structure of corporate ownership can make their performance weaker. By the 
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way, since no information on foreign owners in corporate ownership structure, this type of property 
did not review. In addition to the mentioned cases on ownership concentration, no meaningful 
relationship found between corporate value and ownership concentration, rejecting the hypothesis of 
convergence interest. 
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